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LANDLORD AND TENANT

LANDLORD AND TENANT: CAVEAT EMPTOR IN
OKLAHOMA

-

NEED FOR REFORM

Originally the landlord-tenant relationship was considered as a contractual arrangement.' The tenant was a "termer"
who "had no right in the land, but merely the benefit of a
contract." 2 By the 16th century this conception had changed
and the tenant's interest in the land was considered to be a
possessory estate with rights against the landlord, as well as
third parties, for interference with its enjoyment.3 Under
this conception the lease granted a present estate to the tenant
with a reversionary interest in the landlord.4 This metamorphosis brought the landlord-tenant relationship within the
realm of real property law and the lease which put the tenant
in possession of the land was considered to be a conveyance
of an estate to the tenant, rather than a contractual arrangement. 5
The landlord-tenant relationship developed when agrarian
society was dominant." The land and its produce, rather than
the structures on the estate, were of prime importance.7 The
landlord's only obligation was to put the tenant in possession of the land.8 Rent paid by the tenant was considered as
quid pro quo for the right of possession.9
1 2 R. PowEL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
221[1], at 177
(1971) [hereinafter cited as PowELL].
2 POWELL 221[1], at 177 (quoting 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAiTLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 113 (1895)).
8 POWELL 221[1], at 177.
4 1 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
5 Id. § 3.11; POWELL 221[1], at 178; Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of
Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FoiwmUW L. REV. 123 (1971).
6 POWELL
233, at 300-01.
7 Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 89, 276 A.2d 248, 250 (1971).
8 PowuLi
233, at 300; Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDHm L. REv. 225, 227 (1969).
9 Quinn & Phillips, supra note 8, at 233.
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Under the doctrine of caveat emptor the tenant was required to inspect the premises and assume the risk of suitability of the estate.10 Since the main concern was centered
on the land, the responsibility for putting and maintaining
any dwelling in a habitable condition rested solely on the
tenant.'1 In its historical setting this burden was not unduly
harsh.12 Structures upon the estate were of simple construction and a tenant could reasonably be expected to possess the
skills and materials necessary to make repairs. 8 However,
the imposition of this burden on the modern tenant is unworkable. The complexity of modern dwellings and the fact
that modern man does not necessarily possess the required
skills 4 makes it impracticable for today's tenant to perform
his own repairs.
Deficiencies in the doctrine of caveat emptor which arise
because of the increasing urbanization of modern society require a re-evaluation of the use of the doctrine in Oklahoma.
This comment will analyze avenues of reform that have been
successful in other jurisdictions and suggest possible approaches for Oklahoma.
I. OxLAHO A DEcIsIoNS
With respect to both commercial and residential leases,
Oklahoma has consistently adhered to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.
Tucker v. Bennett 5 is illustrative of the application of the
1o PowELL 233, at 300; 1 AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
11 See authorities cited notes 7-10 supra.
n1IAmRCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
18 Id.; Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
1 1 A.TvRcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C.
'r

Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
15 Okla. 187, 81 P. 423 (1905).
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doctrine to commercial leases. In this case the lessor sued

for rent due on premises leased to the tenant for printing and
publishing a newspaper. The tenant alleged that the lessor
had represented that the rental property was suitable for such
a purpose, but afterwards found that the flooring was too weak
to support the necessary equipment. Alleging the existence
of an oral agreement to make the necessary repairs and the
failure of the landlord to do so, the tenant claimed that the
premises were untenantable.
In refuting the tenant's claim, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court relied on the common law and stated that "it is the
well-settled rule that, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, the landlord is generally under no obligation to his tenant to keep the demised premises in repair."1 6
17
The tenant's claim that the lessor was under a statutory duty
16

17

Id. at 188, 81 P. at 424. See also Clifton v. Charles E. Bainbridge Co., 297 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1956); Wick v. Wasson, 193
Okla. 209, 142 P.2d 124 (1943); Arbuckle Realty Trust v.
Rosson, 180 Okla. 20, 67 P.2d 444 (1937); Nehring v. Ferguson, 170 Okla. 383, 40 P.2d 1040 (1935); Barker v. Findley,
136 Okla. 55, 275 P. 1054 (1929); Enterprise Seed Co. v.
Moore, 51 Okla. 477, 151 P. 867 (1915).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 31 (1971), which provides:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation
of human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for
such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, except that the lessee must repair all
deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his
ordinary negligence.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 32 (1971), which provides.
If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor
of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects
to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, and
deduct the expense of such repairs from the rent,
or otherwise recover it from the lessor; or the lessee
may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be
discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions.
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to place the premises in a condition fit for occupation was
also rejected by the Oklahoma court. The court held that the
statute was applicable only to leases of premises that were
"intended for the ocupation of human beings"' 8 and not to
commercial leases.
In Gordon v. Reinheimer"9 the tenant, under an oral renewal of a lease, rented the premises for a mercantile business with the understanding that the lessor would keep the
building in tenantable condition. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court rejected the tenant's claim for damages resulting from
the disrepair of the building on the basis that, in absence of
a written agreement to the contrary, there is no implied duty
on a lessor of business premises to keep the demised prop20
erty in good repair.
The holding in these cases indicates that the doctrine of
caveat emptor is still very much alive in Oklahoma, at least
with respect to commercial leases, since the statute prescribing the duties of a lessor to repair and maintain leased premises applies only to residential property. Thus, in order to
protect himself the commercial lessee can only rely on written provisions embodied in the lease instrument.
2
In the area of residential leases, Lavery v. Brigance '
expresses the prevailing view in Oklahoma. The tenant was
injured when gas escaping from an uncapped pipe exploded.
The tenant alleged that the house was unfit for habitation
because of the open pipe beneath the floor of the dwelling.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the tenant's claim and
stated that "in the absence of a statute, or an agreement,
there is no implied warranty that leased premises are suit18

15 Okla. at 190, 81 P. at 425. See also Clifton v. Charles E.
Bainbridge Co., 297 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1956); Teeter v. MidWest Enterprise Co., 174 Okla. 644, 52 P.2d 810 (1935) ; Barker v. Findley, 136 Okla. 55, 275 P. 1054 (1929).

19 167 Okla. 343, 29 P.2d 596 (1934).
20

Id. at 345, 29 P.2d at 598.

21 122 Okla. 31, 242 P. 239 (1925).
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able for the purposes for which they are demised." 22 The court
held that, in the absence of fraud, deceit or warranty, the
duty is on the tenant to inspect the premises for habitability
and suitability and that the landlord was not liable for injuries caused by latent defects. 3 This decision indicates that
the doctrine of caveat emptor will be strictly applied in Oklahoma whenever the tenant takes full control over the leased
premises. 24
Oklahoma does have a statutory provision which requires
the landlord to place a dwelling in a habitable condition and
to make subsequent repairs whenever necessary.2 The statute
provides that, if the landlord fails to meet the statutory obligation, the tenant may either repair the defect and deduct
22
2

24

2

Id. at 32, 242 P. at 240.
rd. at 33, 242 P. at 241.
Id.; accord, Wick v. Wasson, 193 Okla. 209, 142 P.2d 124
(1943); King v. Collins, 190 Okla. 601, 126 P.2d 76 (1942);
Arbuckle Realty Trust v. Rosson, 180 Okla. 20, 67 P.2d 444
(1937); Price v. MacThwaite Oil & Gas Co., 177 Okla. 495,
61 P.2d 177 (1936); Young v. Beattie, 172 Okla. 250, 45 P.2d
470 (1935); Nehring v. Ferguson, 170 Okla. 383, 40 P.2d
1040 (1935). There are two exceptions to this general rule.
The first exception pertains to common areas not under the
exclusive control of the tenant; see Geesing v. Pendergrass,
417 P.2d 322 (Okla. 1966) (defective common stairway);
Price v. Smith, 373 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1962) (faulty gas pipe
in common bathroom); Staples v. Baty, 206 Okla. 288, 242
P.2d 705 (1952) (faulty common stairway); Arnold v. Walters, 203 Okla. 503, 224 P.2d 261 (1950) (defective walkway).
The second exception pertains to negligent repairs gratuitously made by the landlord; see Beard v. General Real Estate Corp., 229 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1956); Crane Co. v. Sears,
168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934); Horton v. Early, 39 Okla.
99, 134 P. 436 (1913) (in which the court stated that "the
law distinguishes between [what] the landlord ... is not
legally bound to do, and his doing it in a negligent manner." Id. at 101, 134 P. at 438).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 31 (1971), for the text of the statute
see note 17 supra.
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the cost of the repairs from the rent or vacate the premises.28
While these provisions appear to protect the tenant, in actuali27
ty they fail to provide him with an adequate remedy.
The remedies of either repairing the defect and deducting
the cost from the rent or vacating the premises are exclusive
in Oklahoma. 28 The tenant does not have an alternative cause
of action if the landlord refuses or fails to make necessary
repairs.29 In Atfe v. New York Life Ins. Co.30 the plaintiff,
a member of the tenant's household, was injured by a defective gas connection in the dwelling. The landlord had failed to send a repairman as promised before the accident. After
establishing that the relevant Oklahoma statutes 31 provide
the exclusive remedies for a landlord's failure to make necessary repairs, the court held that there is no right 32to a tort
action for personal injuries because of non-repair.
In King v. Collins3 3 the tenant, an old woman with failing eyesight, sued the landlord for injuries sustained when
she fell from a porch. The landlord had failed to carry out
a promise made prior to the accident to erect a banister around
the porch. In its opinion the Oklahoma court reasoned that,
regardless of whether the promise to repair was made or
whether an obligation to repair arose under the Oklahoma
26 OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 32 (1971), for the text of the statute

see note 17 supra.
See cases cited notes 16, 18, 24 supra.
28 Wallace v. Williams, 313 P.2d 784 (Okla. 1957); King v.
Collins, 190 Okla. 601, 126 P.2d 76 (1942) ; Alfe v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 180 Okla. 87, 67 P.2d 947 (1937); Young v.
Beattie, 172 Okla. 250, 45 P.2d 470 (1935); Ewing v. Cadwell, 121 Okla. 115, 247 P. 665 (1925); Lavery v. Brigance,
122 Okla. 31, 242 P. 239 (1925).
29 Alfe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 180 Okla. 87, 89, 67 P.2d
947, 949 (1937).
30 180 Okla. 87, 67 P.2d 947 (1937).
31 OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (1971).
32 180 Okla. at 89, 67 P.2d at 949.
33 190 Okla. 601, 126 P.2d 76 (1942).
27
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statute, 4 to hold that a cause of action existed would "defeat the very purpose of the statute, to wit, to prevent actions
in tort by persons injured by reason of a failure to repair
premises by the landlord."' 5 By relieving the landlord of tort
liability for the refusal or failure to make repairs, these decisions effectively destroy the incentive to maintain the leased
premises in a fit condition.
The rights and remedies provided by statute in Oklahoma appear illusory at best. The tenant may be discouraged
from repairing by the high costs involved and the complications which might arise from the attempt to deduct the costs
over an extended period of time. Structural complexities of
modern dwellings may also inhibit the undertaking of repairs by the tenant. The inhabitant of a multiple dwelling
unit may decide not to repair a defect that extends beyond
his own unit, such as central heating, electrical or plumbing
systems. The right to vacate the premises is also of limited
value. Housing shortages,8 6 the number of children, lack of
equal bargaining power, receipt of public assistance 37 and
race are some of the possible factors which might restrict
the availability of alternative housing.

1I.

TRm-DS

The doctrine of caveat emptor has been severely criticized
and landlord-tenant law has been described as "a scandal." 38
Increasing concern has prompted many courts and commenta34 Id. at 602, 126 P.2d at 77.
85 Id.

186
Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard
Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of
Columbia, 59 GEo. L.J. 909 (1971); William J. Davis, Inc.
v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970); Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ.
Ct. 1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
37 William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412, 415 n.12 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1970).
88 Quinn & Phillips, supra note 8, at 225.
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tors to re-evaluate and redefine the traditional common law
concept of caveat emptor in light of presently existing social and economic conditions. In a number of recent decisions
in other jurisdictions the residential lease has been considered as a contractual arrangement embodying an implied warranty of habitability.3 9
In Lemle v. Breeden4" the tenant leased a furnished dwelling consisting of several structures after making a half-hour
inspection of the premises during the daylight hours. The
first evening after moving into the dwelling the tenant discovered that the premises were infested with rats. The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that rodent infestation of the
leased premises was a breach of an implied warranty of
habitability and allowed the tenant to recover his initial deposit and rent payment. In reaching this decision the court
recognized that the common law conception of a residential
lease as a conveyance of an estate is "no longer viable" 41 since
the modern tenant is interested in the premises "for living
purposes"4 2 rather than for his livelihood. Drawing an analogy
to the sale of chattels with the implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability,4 3 the court characterized the lease as
44
both the transfer of an estate and a contractual relationship.
Relying on the contractual nature of the lease arrangement,
the court concluded that there is an implied warranty of
habitability and fitness for the intended use in the lease of
a dwelling.45 The court's acceptance of the "more flexible
234[2]; Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
39 Powvm
1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden,
462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
40 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
41
42

Id. at 473.-Id.

43 Id. at 473-74.

44 Id. at 474.
45 Id. While the dwelling in Lemle was a furnished house,
the court expanded its holding to include unfurnished
homes in Lund v. MacArthur, 462 P.2d 482 (Hawaii 1969).
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concept" of an implied warranty of habitability lessens the
46
importance of the judicial fiction of constructive eviction
by making the more "consistent and responsive" remedies
of damages, reformation and recission available to the tenant
for a material breach of the lease contract. 47 On the basis
of this reasoning, Lemle abrogated the common law concept
of caveat emptor.
Taking a somewhat different approach is Javins v. First
National Realty Corp.48 In this case the landlord was seeking possession of the premises after the tenants defaulted in
the rental payments. The tenants admitted non-payment of
the rent but defended on the basis that the landlord had
violated the District of Columbia Housing Regulations. In its
opinion the court held that an implied warranty of habitability arose by operation of law because of the housing regulations 49 and that contract remedies would be applied for
a breach of the warranty. 50
In a lucid opinion the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia traced the historical aspects of landlord-tenant
law and analyzed its place in modern society. Drawing an
analogy to the implied warranty of fitness that exists in the
sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, the renting of chattels and the sale of services,51 the court concluded
that the old rule of caveat emptor "must be abandoned." 52
Arguing that the common law must recognize the demise
of caveat emptor, the court cited three considerations supporting this conclusion: 1) the recognition that the historical
factual assumptions which form the basis for the doctrine are
no longer true; 2) consumer protection; and 3) the modern
46 462 P.2d at 475.

Id.
48 428
40 Id.
1; Id.
51 Id.
52 Ia.
47

F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
at 1072-73.
at 1075.

at 1077.
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urban housing shortage.5 3 Drawing on legal principles established in the area of products liability and consumer protection, the court was of the opinion that the lessee's reliance
on the representations and special knowledge of the lessor
should be given legal protection and, since the tenant is
required to pay the same amount of rent throughout the
term of the lease, the landlord should be required to maintain the premises in their original condition.55 The court indicated its abandonment of the doctrine of caveat emptor by
stating that contract principles "provide a m o r e rational
framework for the apportionment of landlord-tenant responsibilities; they strongly suggest that a warranty of habitability be implied into all contracts for urban dwellings."5 6
While the opinion in Javins offers support for the proposition that a warranty of habitability should be implied in
fact in all leases of residential premises, the strict holding
in the decision is that the warranty is implied by operation
of law because of the district's housing regulations, 7 which
the court stated must be read into every housing contract.5 8
Accordingly, the court found that the tenant's obligation to
pay rent was commensurate with "the landlord's performance
of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the
premises in habitable condition." 59
Id.
Id. at 1079.
,r Id.
16 Id. at 1080 (footnote omitted).
57 Id. at 1082.
53
.4

58 Id. at 1081.
5 Id. at 1082. Javins relied on Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt.
Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960), which required the landlord to place the premises in a safe condition prior to rental
and to install and maintain the utilities required under the
housing regulations and Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237
A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), which held that the rental
of a dwelling in violation of the housing regulations was
an illegal contract which conferred no rights on the wrongdoer. Id. at 837. The court in Javins was impressed by the
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0 the tenant, after signing a one year
In Marini v. IrelandG
lease, discovered that the toilet in the apartment was cracked and leaking water onto the floor of the bathroom. After
several unsuccessful attempts to notify the landlord, the tenant hired a plumber to repair the toilet and deducted the cost
of the repairs from the rent. The landlord sued the tenant
for possession of the apartment for non-payment of the full
rent. Construing the lease as a contract, the New Jersey court
looked to the "object" to be accomplished by the parties6 '
and considered the "subject matter and circumstances of the
letting" to determine the "natural intentions of the parties."6 2
Since the "subject matter" of the transaction was a dwelling, the court found a clear implication that the parties intended the premises to be "habitable and fit for living."6 3 On
the basis of this finding the court held that the natural intent of the parties gave rise to an implied covenant of habit-

ability 64 with the ancillary duty of maintaining and repairing

the premises during the term of the lease.65
The remedies espoused in Marini for the landlord's breach
of the implied warranty are similar to the Oklahoma statutory
"comprehensive regulatory scheme" of the District's housing regulations which 1) set housing standards, 2) specified
whether the lessor or lessee is responsible for satisfying
each of the standards and 3) provided for enforcement of
the Regulations. 428 F.2d at 1080.
60 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). See also Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
61 56 N.J. at 137, 265 A.2d at 533.
62 Id.

Id. at 138, 265 A.2d at 534. The court refused to indulge
in a semantical game and decided that a warranty against
latent defects is the same as a warranty of habitability, the
court stated that it did not matter whether the covenant
was termed "one 'to repair' or 'of habitability and livability
fitness.'" Id.
65 56 N.J. at 138, 265 A.2d at 534.
6
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remedies. 66 The Marini decision gave the tenant the option
of vacating the premises under the doctrine of constructive
eviction or, in recognition of the urban housing shortage, of
making reasonable repairs and deducting the cost from the
rent. 7 This harsh limitation of remedies was modified by the
subsequent decision of a lower New Jersey court in Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Brown.68 In this case the landlord sought possession of the apartment for non-payment of rent. The tenant
claimed that the landlord had failed to provide heat, hot water
and garbage disposal, that the apartment was unpainted, that
the wall plaster was cracked and that water leaked into the
bathroom. The New Jersey District Court held that a restriction of the tenant's remedies for a breach of an implied covenant of habitability to those outlined in Marini would be a
retreat from the principles underlying that decision. 69 Realizing that a tenant in a multi-storied dwelling is in no position
to make repairs,70 the court followed a "percentage-diminution approach",7 1 which it characterized as a sufficiently accurate remedy,72 to allow a partial abatement of the rent.
Under this formula the court allowed the tenant to reduce
the rent by an amount proportionate to the corresponding reduction in the living quality or fair market value of the leased
73

premises.
68

See OHLA.

STAT.

tit. 41, § 32 (1971) and the text accompany-

ing notes 19-25 supra.
56 N.J. at 139, 265 A.2d at 535.
68 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
9 Id. at 480-81, 268 A.2d at 559-60.
70 Id. at 481, 268 A.2d at 560.
71 Id. at 483, 268 A.2d at 562.
67

72

Id.

73 Id. at 482, 268 A.2d at 561. Although an express covenant
was involved in Berzito v. Gambino, 114 N.J. Super. 124,
274 A.2d 865 (Dist. Ct. 1971), the court in this case held
that the payment of rent over an extended period of time
did not waive the landlord's breach of warranty. Since a
housing shortage for low income families with children
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The obvious trend in these and other jurisdictions74 is to
abrogate the outdated common law doctrine of caveat emptor.
These courts have resorted to contract principles and implied
warranties of habitability and fitness in order to achieve more
just results in light of existing social and urban conditions.
III. SUGGESTIONS

Oklahoma can no longer claim to be a rural state. The
state is fast approaching the same balance of rural-urban inforced the family to remain at their present location, the
court determined that the payment of rent did not constitute a voluntary relinquishment of the claim. Id. at 127,
274 A.2d at 868.
74

See Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ.
Ct. 1971) (which held that the landlord's breach of his
statutory duty to repair enables the tenant to repair and
deduct in emergency situations); Amanuensis, Ltd. v.
Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971)
(which held that the landlord's violation of a state statute
and the housing code was a valid defense to eviction proceedings for non-payment of rent); Garcia v. Freeland
Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Civ. Ct.
1970) (which held that, where a state statute is enforceable
only by a municipality, the tenant has a cause of action
for reimbursement of expenses that save the landlord from
an actionable tort that might have resulted from the landlord's inaction). Recently, the United States Supreme Court,
in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), held that Oregon's
forcible entry and wrongful detainer statute did not, on
its face, violate the due process or equal protection provisions of the Constitution; however, a double bond requirement for the right to appeal was considered a denial of
equal protection. In its opinion the Court held that there
was no constitutional right to housing "of a particular
quality" and stated that the "Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill." Id. at
74. However, the Court did note that defenses such as a
breach of an implied warranty and violations of a housing
code were recognized in some jurisdictions. Id. at 69.
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habitants as the United States as a whole.7 r Of twenty-nine
incorporated cities with a population of 10,000 or more, twenty-five have increased in population between 1960 and 1970.76
Of these twenty-five, fifteen have increased in population by
at least 10%.

7

Oklahoma as a whole has increased in urban

population by 18.8% between 1960 and 1970, while the rural
population has declined during the same period by 5.2%.71
This shift in the state's population provides the basis f o r
abrogating the rule of caveat emptor; an urbanized state requires new concepts to deal with a legal relationship that
grew out of an agrarian society.
75

Oklahoma had more urban inhabitants than rural, for the
first time, in 1950. The urban-rural breakdown since 1950
is as follows.
Year
Urban
Rural
1950
51.0%
49.0%
1960
62.9%
37.1%
1970
68.0%
32.0%
U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION:

1970, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, FINAL REPORT PC (1)-A 38
OKLAHOMA.

76

The breakdown for the United States for the same period is:
Year
Urban
Rural
1950
64.0%
36.0%
1960
69.9%
30.1%
1970
73.5%
26.5%
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1971.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION:
1970, NuzmER oF INmABITANTS, FINAL REPORT PC (1)-A 38
OKLAHOMA.

Tulsa has increased in population by 26.7%; Oklahoma City
by 13%; Broken Arrow by 98.8%; Stillwater by 29.9%;
Midwest City by 33.4%; Norman by 56%; Edmond by 93.9%;
Sand Springs by 48.6%; El Reno by 31.7%; Moore by 952.2%;
Lawton by 20.7%; Del City by 76.5%; Bethany by 76.5%;
Enid by 13.3%; and The Village by 13%. Id.
78 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION:
1970, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, FINAL REPORT PC (1)-A 38
"

OKLAHOMA.
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When the Oklahoma court decides to re-evaluate the doctrine of caveat emptor, three rationales are at its disposalLemle, Marini or Javins.
Lemle rejected the doctrine on the basis of judicial decision. This method is open to the Oklahoma court. While the
court may be influenced by stare decisis, a fresh look at the
Oklahoma statute and an understanding of current social
problems should produce the desired reform. Since the
statute79 is written in terms of the landlord's obligations, the
court could interpret it to allow the enforcement of the more
flexible contractual remedies available for a breach of an implied warranty of habitability.
As an alternative the Oklahoma court could follow the
Marini decision by considering the natural intent of the parties at the time of the leasing. Taking price into consideration, both parties would be concerned with the best housing
available for the tenant. Since the tenant would not actively
seek out inadequate housing, the court could impose on the
landlord the obligation of an implied warranty of habitability.
If it "appears to be impossible or impractical for the tenant to
repair or vacate the premises, the court, by following the lead
of Academy Spires, could alleviate the harshness of the statutory remedies for a breach of the implied warranty by allowing a partial abatement of the rent.
Since municipal housing codes are commonplace, the
methodology of Javins is also available. Municipalities have
the inherent police power to set reasonable standards for the
health, safety and welfare of their inhabitants" and it would
seem only reasonable that an implied warranty could be found
71

so

tit. 41, § 31 (1971).
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). For cases
upholding the constitutionality of housing standards, see
Tenement House Dept. v. Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E.
231 (1904); Health Dept. v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145
N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895).
OKLA. STAT.
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on the basis of the local housing codes. Generally, housing
codes make a legislative finding that substandard housing exists within the municipality, that such housing adversely affects the public health, safety and general welfare and that
the imposition of minimum housing standards is necessary."'
These findings should provide a sufficient basis for abrogating
the doctrine of caveat emptor and for enforcing an implied
warranty of habitability in a residential lease.8 2 Support for
such a decision might also be found in the language prohibiting the occupancy of a dwelling which does not meet the
81

82

E.g., TULsA, OKLA. ORDIAN CES tit. 55, ch. 1, § 1 (1968):
Legislative Finding. It is hereby found that there
exists, within the city of Tulsa, premises, dwellings
. . . which by reason of their structure, equipment,
sanitation, maintenance . . . affect or are likely to
affect adversely the public health, . . . safety, and
general welfare ....
[T]he establishment and enforcement of minimum housing standards are required.
Purpose. It is hereby declared that the purpose
of this ordinance is to protect and preserve, and promote the physical and mental health and social wellbeing of the people, to prevent and control . . . communicable diseases, to regulate privately and publicly owned dwellings for the purpose of maintaining adequate sanitation and public health, and to protect the safety of the people and to promote the general welfare by legislation which shall be applicable
to all dwellings now in existence or hereinafter constructed. It is hereby further declared that the purpose of this ordinance is to insure that the quality
of housing is adequate for the protection of public
health, safety, and general welfare, including: establishment of minimum housing standards . ...
See also Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1968).
See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
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minimum standards set forth in the housing regulations. 83
The enactment of these codes8 4 also allows the municipality
to "localize" its standards by taking into consideration its particular needs and setting.

IV. CONCLUSION
The need for change in Oklahoma's landlord-tenant law
is apparent. Whether by judicial decision or statutory enactment 5 the doctrine of caveat emptor should be abandoned. Its
replacement should be equally fair for both the tenant and
the landlord.
Courts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the
light of the facts and values of contemporary lifeparticularly old common law doctrines which t h e
courts themselves created and developeds 6
Joseph J. Van Walraven
8
84

85

86

Cases cited note 82 supra. See TULSA, OKLA. ORDINANCES tit.
55, ch. 2, §§ 21-26 (1968).
In the absence of local housing regulations the court may
have to rely on the Lemle or Marini rationales.
There have been various model landlord-tenant acts suggested. While they may not be a panacea for all jurisdictions, the model acts deserve serious consideration when
drafting housing legislation. See Daniels, supra note 24, at
958-61; Dooley & Goldberg, A Model Tenant's Remedies Act,
7 HAuv. J. LEGIs. 357 (1970); AwicAN BAR FOUNDATION,
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft
1969).
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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